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ABSTRACT This article aims to describe the contemporary objectives and tactics of activist hedge
funds as well as the actions taken by the targeted companies as a result of their intervention. In this
research, we explore the consequences of activism over time (impact on operational performance
and share price returns) and compare these with a random sample of ﬁrms with similar character-
istics at the time of intervention; we also analyse the singularities associated with salient sub-groups
of targeted ﬁrms. The sample used for our research consists of all 259 ﬁrms targeted by activist hedge
funds in 2010 and 2011. We found evidence that any improvements in operating performance
(return on assets, return on equity, Tobin’s Q) result mainly from selling assets, cutting capital
expenditures, buying back shares, reduce workforce and other basic ﬁnancial manoeuvres. Although
there is no evidence of deterioration over a 3-year period, the stock’s performance of targeted
companies over a 3-year span barely matches the performance of a random sample of companies.
We found that the best way for activists to make money for their funds is to get the company sold off
or substantial assets spun off. If not sold, the hedge fund episode often results for the targeted ﬁrms in
change of senior management and board members, stagnation of assets and R&D. This research
does not provide any evidence of the superior strategic sagacity of hedge fund managers, but does
point to their keen understanding of what moves stock prices in the short term.
Keywords: shareholder activism; hedge funds; board of directors; corporate governance; value
creation; short term
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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder activism comes in many shapes and
hues (Nili, 2014). There is the socially minded,
issue-driven, form of activism (Rehbein et al,
2013, p. 137), the ‘soft’ activism of institutional
investors and the ‘hard’, ﬁnancially driven, acti-
vism practiced principally by hedge funds. Social
activism usually takes the form of pressures on
corporations to change their social agenda and
cope with environmental, moral, religious or
other non-business issues. The soft activism of
institutional investors usually involves share-
holder proposals aimed at ‘improving corporate
governance’ (Thomas and Cotter, 2007).
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The Shareholder Rights Project set up by the
Harvard Law School Programme on Institutional
Investors is representative of this type of activism.
Finally, the ﬁnancially driven activism of
hedge funds consists of targeting companies
where it is expected that implementing mea-
sures from a menu of manoeuvres will likely
boost their stock prices. The activist ﬁrst
determines whether a company would likely
‘beneﬁt’ from its intervention; if deemed so,
the hedge fund takes an equity position and
then begins to agitate for changes (Kahan and
Rock, 2007). This form of activism is the focus of
this article.
Over the last few years, hedge fund activism
has received a great deal of coverage in ﬁnancial
media (and in the mainstream press), has trig-
gered heated debates and been the focus of
much academic research. Saviour of capitalism
for some, for others, activist hedge funds are but
mongers of short-term tactics that eventually
damage business corporations (Allaire, 2015).
The funds invested with these activists by
institutional investors have been increasing at a
25.4 per cent compounded annual rate between
2010 and 2015 (Turner, 2015).
Flush with the cash showered on these funds
by institutional investors (Plath and Taylor,
2014) and increasingly supported in their
campaigns by mutual funds, pension funds and
other institutional investors, some hedge funds
are now targeting larger ﬁrms with the inten-
tion of forcing a split of their operations or an
outright sale of the whole company (examples
of these include Pershing Square at Allergan,
Mondelez and so on; Trian at Pepsico, Mon-
delez, Dupont and so on; Value Act at Amer-
ican Express).
Much academic research has been carried out
on the topic but the results are less than
compelling. As usual, academia is enlightening
but not decisive.
Here are some of the limitations of recent
research:
1. Events included as actual hedge fund inter-
ventions are vaguely or poorly identiﬁed,
leading to very different numbers of occur-
rences for the same years in different studies.
Table 1 illustrates this point rather strikingly,
indicating large variations in deﬁnitions of
activist events used by different researchers.
For the same period of time or very close
periods, researchers come up with different
numbers of activist interventions.
2. The date at which the intervention really
occurs is rarely explicit; the intervention’s
impact may be measured from the date of
13D ﬁling or other public announcement,
or the date at which the activist’s demands
are satisﬁed and whether the activist is
eventually successful or not with his
demands; these different dates and events
make a signiﬁcant difference in assessing the
impact of the intervention (Goodwin,
2015). Karpoff (2001) illustrated the
discrepancies among 20 empirical studies
on the effects of shareholder activism.
Table 1: Number of hedge funds and targeted companies
Period Number of hedge funds Hedge fund-target pairs Unique target companies
Brav et al (2008) 2001–2006 236 1059 882
Xu and Li (2011) 1994–2008 505 3686 2626
Zhu (2013) 1994–2007 330 1264 988
Clifford (2008) 1998–2005 197 788 N/A
Boyson and Mooradian (2011) 1994–2005 111 418 397
Greenwood and Schor (2009) 1994–2006 139 784 N/A
Gantchev (2013) 2000–2007 171 1164 1023
Bebchuk et al (2013, 2015) 1994–2007 N/A 2040 N/A
Goodwin (2015) 1990–2014 N/A N/A 3202
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He pointed out differences in time periods,
sample sizes, types of events examined
and deﬁnitions of success in shareholder
activism (he found six different deﬁnitions
of success).
3. Several studies, as shown in our Table 1,
have gathered data on hedge fund activism
going back to the 1990s; the nature and
form of this activism have changed greatly
over the years; by including older
instances, these studies risk mixing apples
and oranges in their analysis. Indeed, the
ﬁndings from earlier work on activism
seem to be contradicted by more recent
research. For instance, according to Denes
et al (2015), ‘activism in more recent
years is more frequently associated with
increased share values and operating per-
formance’, while Ikenberry and Lako-
nishok, in 1993, found that ‘[W]hen
dissidents are successful in acquiring board
seats […] a downward drift in cumulative
abnormal returns extending over a 2-year
period following the announcement of the
contest is observed’.
4. Many studies have been focusing on the
impact of activists’ 13D ﬁling on the stock
price of the targeted company over a short
period of time (usually 20 days before and 20
days after). Indeed, there is ample evidence of
‘abnormal’ returns in a short period around
the public disclosure of activism (Brav et al,
2008; Clifford, 2008; Brav et al, 2009;
Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Klein and
Zur, 2009; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011;
Gow et al, 2014; Krishnan et al, 2015), and in
Europe and Asia (Becht et al, 2014).
Many observers interpret this jump in stock
price on the appearance of an activist fund as
evidence of shareholders valuing their brand
of activism. The trouble with that inter-
pretation comes from the fact that, as shown
in Figure 1 by von Lilienfeld-Toal and
Schnitzler (2014), almost all announcements
in the form of 13D ﬁling tend to produce a
boost in stock price of the company.
Figure 1: Abnormal returns for different 13-D filers.
Source: von Lilienfeld-Toal and Schnitzler (2014).
Allaire and Dauphin
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1741-3591 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance Vol. 13, 4, 279–308282
So, there is nothing special about activist
hedge funds in this regard. Investors will tend
to read almost any 13D ﬁling as an indication
that some move is afoot and will not want to
miss out on an opportunity of whatever sort.
5. Studies describing what has happened to
companies after the arrival of an activist fund
have found a mixture of effects: increased
divestiture, decreased acquisition activity,
higher probability for the targeted ﬁrm
being sold out, lower cash balances, higher
payout ratios, greater leverage, higher CEO
turnover and lower CEO compensation,
reduced investment, ‘improved’ return on
assets (ROA) and improved ratio of enter-
prise ‘market’ value to its book value
(Tobin’s Q). But these effects are not linked
to speciﬁc hedge fund strategies and, though
often seen as positive by researchers, it
remains unclear whether companies and
their shareholders have really beneﬁted
from, or been harmed by, these effects
(Briggs, 2007; Gillan and Starks, 2007;
Bebchuk et al, 2013, 2015; Goodwin, 2014;
Gow et al, 2014).
6. Finally, too many of the studies aiming to
show statistical relationships between acti-
vism and company performance have applied
the standard analytics in the ﬁeld of ﬁnancial
economics from which they originate (for
example, Brav et al, 2008, 2009, 2014 and
2015; Bebchuk et al, 2013, 2015); the data
collected is treated with multivariate statistics
bringing together all variables plus dozens or
hundreds of dummy variables. The results,
statistically signiﬁcant here and there, leave
much room for interpretation and a nagging
feeling that the analysis has managed to
obfuscate rather than clarify relationships
(see Epstein and King, 2002; Lipton, 2013;
Allaire and Dauphin, 2014a, b, 2015; Coffee
and Palia, 2014; Strine Jr, 2014).
To cope with several of these shortcomings, we
have designed a study focusing on activist
events of the years 2010 and 2011. These events
are close enough in time to capture the
contemporary tactics and objectives of activist
funds. Yet, these 2 years allow us to monitor
what happened at target companies for some
3 years afterwards.
Speciﬁcally, we are pursuing a number of
research objectives:
 Describe the contemporary tactics and objec-
tives of activist hedge funds as well as the
actions taken by targeted companies as a
result of their intervention
 Explore the consequences of activism over
time when compared with a random sample
of ﬁrms with similar characteristics at the
time of intervention (effects on operational
performance and share price returns)
 Analyse the singularities associated with sali-
ent sub-groups of targeted ﬁrms
METHODOLOGY
The WSJ-FactSet Activism Scorecard lists 461
cases of activism for the years 2010–2011. We
eliminated the ‘activist campaigns’ undertaken
by individuals, by labour unions, by corpora-
tions, by named stockholder groups, by public
pension funds or other stakeholders. The sam-
ple was thus reduced to 342 activist campaigns.
Then, we took out the 52 cases where the
targeted entity was a closed-end fund. The objec-
tives and dynamics of these campaigns differ
from the typical hedge fund activism. Finally,
some 24 companies in the sample were targeted
by more than one hedge fund in the same year,
for a total of 55 campaigns. Therefore, our ﬁnal
sample is comprised of 290 campaigns by 165
activist hedge funds targeting 259 ﬁrms.
Table 2 maps out how and why the original
461 cases became 259 hedge fund campaigns,
each targeting a single company.
These 259 companies belonged to a diverse
set of industries as shown in Table 3. The sample
distribution by industry must be carefully considered
when interpreting statistical results.
We relied on Compustat for the ﬁnancial
data related to the targeted ﬁrms. To ﬁll in
missing data in Compustat, we retrieved the
The game of ‘activist’ hedge funds
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information directly from the SEC ﬁlings of
targeted ﬁrms. Our focus is to map out what has
happened to the performance of these targeted
companies.
It is worth pointing out that several pub-
lished studies on hedge fund activism (see
Table 1) are based on a number of events very
close to the top number in Table 2, which
means that many events were included in these
studies that are not truly cases of hedge fund
activism.
The better known hedge funds show up
again in our sample as the most active players,
ﬁve of them accounting for 67 of the 259
targeted ﬁrms (Table 4).
DESCRIPTION OF OUR SAMPLE
OFACTIVIST EVENTS
Numerous studies have described the gamut of
stated objectives pursued by hedge funds as well
as the variety of tactics used to achieve them (for
example Bratton, 2007, 2010; Brav et al, 2008;
Brav et al, 2009; Greenwood and Schor, 2009;
Becht et al, 2014). Table 5 shows the diversity of
objectives in our sample. Getting the company
sold or some assets spun off is clearly the
dominant objective. It is followed by change in
governance/getting their people on the board
and change in payout policy (basically getting
the company to buy back its shares or pay some
special dividend).
Table 2: Sample selection process
2010 2011 Total
WSJ-FactSet Activism Scorecard 219 242 461
Eliminate campaigns by other types:
Individuals (22) (25) (47)
Labour unions (2) (5) (7)
Corporations (3) (2) (5)
Public pension funds (2) (1) (3)
Other block holders (31) (23) (54)
Mutual fund managers 0 (3) (3)
Total campaigns by hedge funds 159 183 342
Target is a closed-end fund (22) (30) (52)
Campaigns by hedge funds against
corporations
137 153 290
Multiple campaigns against a single
target
(22) (9) (31)
Unique targets 115 144 259
Table 3: Firms by industry within activist sample
Industry (NAICS 2-digits) Number of ﬁrms Percentage of total sample
Mining (21) 6 2.3
Utilities (22) 3 1.2
Construction (23) 2 0.8
Manufacturing – Food, beverage, textiles, clothing and leather (31) 8 3.1
Manufacturing –Wood, paper, chemicals and plastics (32) 34 13.1
Manufacturing –Metal, machinery, appliance and transportation equipment (33) 53 20.4
Wholesale trade (42) 5 1.9
Retail trade (44–45) 10 3.9
Transportation and warehousing (48–49) 2 0.8
Information (51) 32 12.4
Finance and insurance (52) 47 18.1
Real estate rental and leasing (53) 14 5.4
Professional, scientiﬁc and technical services (54) 14 5.4
Administrative, support, waste management and remediation services (56) 4 1.5
Health care and social assistance (62) 8 3.1
Arts, entertainment and recreation (71) 3 1.2
Accommodation and food services (72) 10 3.9
Other services (except Public administration) (81) 4 1.5
Total 259 100%
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Activist hedge funds seek to achieve a quick
and substantial stock price appreciation (Bratton
andWachter, 2015); to achieve their objectives,
they put forth a variety of tactics that often
brings them in conﬂict with the management
and the board of directors of targeted compa-
nies. Table 6 lists the tactics employed by the
activists in 2010 and 2011.
The ﬁrst two tactics may be viewed as
non-hostile (communicate with the board
or the management of the targeted ﬁrm;
reach a private agreement for the activist
to be represented on the board) while the
other tactics are surely hostile (Gantchev,
2013).
In many instances, activist hedge funds
list several tactics so we retained the most
‘hostile’ tactic to classify them. On that basis,
75.29 per cent of the interventions could
be considered hostile (sum of tactics 3–7 in
Table 6), and that the most frequent tactic
employed by activist hedge funds is to publicly
criticize the company, the board or the man-
agement, either through a letter to shareholders,
a press release or directly through a Schedule
13D ﬁling.
Table 4: Five most active hedge funds
Hedge funds Number of
campaigns
Stillwell Value LLC 19
Ramius/Starboard Value LP 17
Icahn Associates Corp. 16
Arcadia Capital Advisors LLC 9
Pershing Square Capital Management LP 6
Table 6: Tactics used by activist hedge funds
2010 2011 Total Percentage of cases
1. Communicate with board/management 22 23 45 17.37
2. Seek board representation without confrontation 10 9 19 7.34
3. Publicly criticize the company 31 42 73 28.19
4. Use the threat of proxy contest or legal action 13 27 40 15.44
5. Launch a proxy ﬁght 32 33 65 25.10
6. Sue the company 1 4 5 1.93
7. Make an unsolicited/hostile offer 6 6 12 4.63
Number of interventions 115 144 259 100.0
Table 5: Activist hedge funds stated objectives
2010 2011 Total Percentage of cases Successful (%)a
Sell the company or asset restructuration 36 44 80 30.89 70.00
Governance structure or board change 29 45 74 28.57 62.16
Change in payout policy 19 26 45 17.37 91.11
Cost reduction 9 6 15 5.79 66.67
Omnibus 5 11 16 6.18 87.50
Other 11 5 16 6.18 62.50
Undisclosed or vaguely described 6 7 13 5.02 69.23
Number of interventions 115 144 259 100.00 71.81
a‘Successful’ refers to the fact that the company announced it was taking steps to implement the objective
stated by the activist hedge fund. In several cases however, as we shall see below, the company did not, could
not, achieve the implementation of the objective sought by the hedge fund.
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Table 7 shows that activists were successful in
some 72 per cent of cases in achieving partially
or completely their objectives, particularly so
when they behaved in a hostile manner.
As per our Table 8, the activists in our sample
have held the shares of targeted company for a
median period of 458 days and on average for
527 days (or about a year and a half).
Their stake in the equity of the targeted
companies at the time of their announcement
represented some 9 per cent on average of total
outstanding common shares (Table 9).
A MATCHED RANDOM SAMPLE
To calibrate the actions and performance of
these 259 targeted companies, we have set up
a random sample of 259 companies selected to
match the targeted companies at year t in terms
of industry classiﬁcation and market value.1 Tables
10, 11, 12 and 13 present statistics that clearly
show the close ﬁt between the random sample
and the set of targeted companies at time=
t, the year activists targeted these speciﬁc
companies.
Although the activist hedge funds targeting
large companies get lots of media coverage, it
appears from our study, and as reported in
several other studies (Brav et al, 2008; Aslan
and Maraachlian, 2009; Greenwood and Schor,
Table 7: Success rate of activist campaigns by tactic
employeda
Tactics Successful (%)
Communicate with board/management 57.78
Publicly criticize the company 58.90
Use the threat of proxy contest or legal
action
85.00
Launch a proxy ﬁght 83.08
Sue the company 20.00
Make an unsolicited/hostile offer 75.00
Overall success rate 71.81
aThe tactic labelled ‘Seek board representation with-
out confrontation’ is only accounted for when
successful, because unsuccessful attempts are not
publicly known, and thus fall into the other cate-
gories. For that reason, this tactic was withdrawn
from this table.
Table 8: Holding period after announcement
(days) for concluded endeavours
Centile 2010 2011 Total
25th 203 181 183
50th 410 479 458
75th 785 774 784
90th 1361 1019 1069
Mean 546 507 527
Note: N= 200; as of April 2015, activists were still
holding a stake (or we were unable to track an
ofﬁcial exit date) in 59 ﬁrms of the sample (16 in
2010 and 43 in 2011).
Table 9: Stake ownership at announcement (%)
Centile 2010 2011 Total
25th 5.55 5.18 5.30
50th 9.06 7.20 7.70
75th 12.42 9.60 10.09
90th 18.33 14.50 16.48
Mean 10.44 7.90 9.05
Table 10: Median results of a set of descriptive






















aFrom 31 December, year t−1, to 31 December,
year t.
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2009; Klein and Zur, 2009; Boyson and
Mooradian, 2011; Gantchev et al, 2015), that
the median company targeted by activists is
fairly small (market cap=US$148 million; rev-
enues= $201 million).
Not only are many of the targeted companies
fairly small but, as shown in Table 11, a
signiﬁcant number of them are not traded on
either the NYSE or NASDAQ but merely
trade over the counter (OTC) (the so-called
‘pink sheets’).
Our random sample offers a near perfect
match in this respect. Similar characteristic
were found by Krishnan et al (2015) in their
sample where 64.5 per cent of the ﬁrms were
listed on the NASDAQ. Klein and Zur (2009)
found that 52.3 per cent of the ﬁrms targeted
by activist hedge funds were listed on the
NASDAQ, and almost 10 per cent of them
were traded through OTC bulletin/pink
sheets.
Table 12 shows the characteristics of targeted
ﬁrms per quintile of market cap, while Table 13
Table 11: Exchange or market where shares of
targeted ﬁrms and random sample ﬁrms were traded
on 31 December of the year preceding initial












Table 13: Median results of a set of descriptive variables at t−1 for the random sample ﬁrms, per quintile of
market cap
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Market Cap at campaign date(M$) 12.6 55.2 150.7 533.5 3642.0
Total Assets (M$) 28.6 88.7 143.0 398.5 4558.5
Revenues (M$) 17.2 43.1 84.9 398.4 2442.7
Number of employees 93 168 316 1074 5843
ROA 0.0149 0.0598 0.0481 0.0695 0.0761
ROE −0.0009 0.0367 0.0684 0.0490 0.0901
Tobin’s Q 0.9493 1.2060 1.6159 2.0987 1.8500
1-yr Share price returna −0.1429 −0.0359 −0.0136 0.1552 0.0596
aFrom 31 December, year t−1, to 31 December, year t.
Table 12: Median results of a set of descriptive variables at t−1 for the targeted ﬁrms, per quintile of market cap
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Market cap at campaign date(M$) 21.0 55.3 148.3 477.3 5119.6
Total assets (M$) 55.1 128.1 322.5 720.2 5570.8
Revenues (M$) 18.5 71.3 198.4 690.2 4180.4
Number of employees 87 220 500 1576 10 500
ROA 0.0337 0.0088 −0.0024 0.0066 0.0776
ROE 0.0116 −0.0049 −0.0016 0.0110 0.0563
Tobin’s Q 0.8026 1.0336 1.2151 1.2377 1.6190
1-year share price returna 0.0714 −0.1520 −0.0702 −0.0250 0.1593
aFrom 31 December, year t−1 to 31 December, year t.
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provides the same information for our random
sample. The very different proﬁles of ﬁrms in
each quintile in terms of operating performance
(ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q) or stock market
performance mean that mixing all of them to
come up with some general conclusion is very
hazardous.
In both the targeted sample and the random
sample, the Quintile 1 (Q1) and Q2 ﬁrms are
very small, have low Tobin’s Q and/or poor
1-year share price performance. To the extent
that these are the factors motivating hedge
fund attacks, clearly the random sample ﬁrms
would have been as likely to be targeted as the
ﬁrms that were actually targeted. As for the Q5
ﬁrms, both the random sample ones and the
Targeted ones show good operating perfor-
mance and solid 1-year stock price perfor-
mance. Whatever attracted hedge funds to
these companies, their proﬁle is not signiﬁ-
cantly different than the proﬁle of the Q5 ﬁrms
in our random sample.2
Clearly, the objectives and motives for
targeting ﬁrms vary by quintile, as shown in
Table 14. The smaller targeted ﬁrms of Q1 and
Q2 are pushed to buy back shares and make
some board change. The larger companies of
Q4 and Q5 are targeted mainly for a sale or a
spin-off of assets, with some governance/board
claims as a preliminary step.
These features of hedge fund activism must
be kept well in mind when statistical analyses
are carried out. For instance, the presence of a
few very large companies in the sample trans-
lates in mean numbers that are not descriptive
of the whole sample. Similarly, the very small
size of some companies, often penny stocks
traded over the counter, makes for very large
variations in their operating performance and
stock prices with the slightest addition to
volume or improvement of performance
(often in the 1000 per cent). Computing the
mean improvement in performance will be
unduly inﬂuenced by these very small
companies.
Therefore, we shall make abundant descrip-
tive use of medians throughout this article, as it
is notably less inﬂuenced by extreme values. We
shall report means on occasions but always with
the above caveat in mind.
We have made a deliberate decision to keep
the data analysis simple so that the reader who
is not proﬁcient in statistical analysis can get a
real sense of the results. Not much is lost by
not resorting to the standard machinery of
multivariate statistics in situations like the
present one where multiple dynamics are at
play; too often these sorts of ‘complex’ ana-
lyses lead to an over-simpliﬁcation of the
phenomenon, a disconnect between the origi-
nal data and the results produced by these
‘sophisticated’ analyses and a nagging feeling
that the analysis has managed to obfuscate
rather than clarify relationships.
Table 14: Percentage of ﬁrms targeted by activist hedge funds according to the stated objectives, by quintiles
of market capitalization at intervention datea
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Overall
Sell the company or asset restructuration 19.61 23.08 32.69 34.62 44.23 30.89
Governance structure or board change 23.53 42.31 28.85 28.85 19.23 28.57
Change in payout policy 29.41 15.38 19.23 15.38 7.69 17.37
Cost reduction 1.96 9.62 5.77 9.62 1.92 5.79
Omnibus 5.88 5.77 3.85 7.69 7.69 6.18
Other 17.65 1.92 3.85 0.00 7.69 6.18
Undisclosed or vaguely described 1.96 1.92 5.77 3.85 11.54 5.02
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
aOwing to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100 per cent.
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Whether at the urging of hedge funds (prob-
able) or pre-emptively (possible) or as a result of
their own analysis (doubtful), targeted compa-
nies show evidence of having taken singularly
different actions than those observed in a
comparable random sample of companies.
Survivorship
Hedge funds targeted 80 companies (see Table
5) with the explicit aim of getting the company
sold or merged or some part of it spun off.
Clearly, this intention has translated in far
greater number of disappearing companies in
the activist sample, as illustrated in Figure 2 and
detailed in Table 15. The random sample shows
a ‘normal’ attrition rate of some 16 per cent
over 4 years but the number of ﬁrms in the
activist sample drops by some 37 per cent in the
same time period.
Some 81 companies were sold or merged
over the 4 years after the arrival of an activist; in
many cases the sale or merger was consum-
mated very quickly. This number compares
with the 36 companies of the random sample
sold or merged during the same period. In
addition, activists often call on management to
sell off and liquidate ‘unproﬁtable business units
and product lines so that they no longer
appeared on the balance sheets as idle or
unproductive assets’ (Welker and Wood, 2011,
p. S63); in our sample, 15 targeted companies
sold off some assets and 7 did spin off a division.
R&D expenses
The median expenditures for research and
development basically stalled then dropped
before turning up in year t+3, a time when most






















t-1 t: Event year t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Activist Random
Figure 2: Number of surviving enterprises: Activist versus random base: 100 at t−1.





t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4a
Activist sample
Firms, beginning of year 259 244 206 191 174
Merged or sold 13 34 12 13 9
Bankrupt, liquidated or
delisted
2 4 3 4 1
n 244 206 191 174 164
Random sample
Firms, beginning of year 259 259 254 235 226
Merged or sold 0 4 17 8 7
Bankrupt, liquidated or
delisted
0 1 2 1 1
Firms, end of year 259 254 235 226 218
aAs of April 2015 for year t+4 of the 2011 samples.
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company. Meanwhile, median R&D expendi-
tures for the random sample of ﬁrms did
increase by over 20 per cent (Figure 3).
Asset level
The same pattern is observed with total assets
(Figure 4), which captures the rate of invest-
ment/disinvestment of companies. Firms tar-
geted by hedge funds basically stall in terms of
total assets, with some resumption of growth by
year t+3 (as most hedge funds have vacated the
place). At that point in time, the ﬁrms in the
random sample have increased their assets by
more than 30 per cent.
Number of employees
Firms targeted by activists have barely
maintained the level of employment while
ﬁrms in the random sample were increasing
employment by some 15 per cent over the same
period of time (Figure 5).
Number of shares outstanding
Similarly, the number of shares outstanding
remains constant, with a small increase in the
third year (Figure 6). However, a sharp drop in
shares outstanding occurs in the sub-group of
ﬁrms targeted for an increase in payout. Mean-
while, the number of shares in the random
sample of ﬁrms increases by more than 9 per
cent.
Turnover rate of CEOs
The data show a large difference in the rate of
CEO turnover between the activist sample and
the random sample, particularly beginning in
the year when activists show up (Figure 7). The




















t-2 t-1 t: Event year t+1 t+2 t+3
Activist Random
Figure 3: Median results, R&D expenses (t−2=100) (surviving firms).
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Figure 4: Median results, total assets (t−2= 100) (surviving firms).
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Turnover rate of CFOs
As with CEOs, the CFOs of targeted compa-
nies are replaced at a high rate immediately
upon activists showing up as shareholders and
goes back to ‘normal’ rate by t+3 (Figure 8).
Conclusions on actions taken
As a broad generalization, which will be reﬁned
later on when we examine the results in relation
with the stated objectives of hedge funds, the
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Figure 7: Turnover rate of CEOs.
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sample, show a much higher rate of companies
sold or merged, as well as a rate of CEO and
CFO change that far exceeds what is observed
in a random sample of comparable ﬁrms.
Our data also shows that the median Tar-
geted ﬁrm reports a reduced or stalled R&D
and total assets, no increase in employment and
a slightly decreasing shareholder base, all of this
in surviving ﬁrms.
The issue of course is whether the regimen
advocated by activists has made targeted ﬁrms
more efﬁcient and healthier, and boosted their
stock price.
OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Several studies (Clifford, 2008; Becht et al,
2009; Bebchuk et al, 2013, 2015; Goodwin,
2014; Gow et al, 2014; Fos, 2015) of hedge fund
performance examine their impact on three
operating ratios: ROA, Tobin’s Q (the ratio of
the market value of the company to its book
value, sort of ) and return on shareholders’
equity (ROE). Let us examine these operating
ratios for our double sample.
Figure 9 maps out the results for ROA. The
activist sample of companies is showing some
slight improvement in ROA when compared
with the year before their arrival (t−1). The
random sample’s median ROA remains pretty
constant but is still higher at year t+3 than the
activist sample’s ROA.
But this ‘improvement’ in ROA is not found
in all quintiles of the Targeted ﬁrms. Figure 10
tells us that the ROA performance for ﬁrms in
Q5 and Q2 has deteriorated slightly while the
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Figure 9: Median results, ROA (surviving firms).
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As for Tobin’s Q, the activist sample shows
improvement at year t+2 when it reaches the
level of Tobin’s Q observed for the random
sample (Figure 11).
Figure 12 presents the results for Tobin’s Q
per quintile. It shows the same basic pattern for
all quintiles.
Digging into the data to understand this
improvement of Tobin’s Q at year t+2, we ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant relationship with the level of assets;
that is, the increase in Q correlates with a
decrease in the book value of assets (equity plus
liabilities) [r=−0.24; P<0.001)].
As Tobin’s Q is computed as the ratio of the
market value of assets (actually, in practice,
market value of equity plus book value of
liabilities) divided by the book value of assets,
any decrease in the denominator, keeping the
market value of the equity constant, will
improve Q. Cutting down on capital expendi-
tures, selling some assets, buying back shares
will produce this result, as we ﬁnd out in this
study (see Figure 4).
Indeed, a number of companies were tar-
geted where the intent of the hedge fund was to
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Figure 11: Median results, Tobin’s Q (surviving firms).
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63 companies did buy back some of their shares.
Any share buyback will decrease the book value
of equity, more so if bought back at a price
higher than the book value per share. We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant correlation (r=−0.33; P<0.001)
between a decrease in the number of shares in
circulation and increase in Tobin’s Q for these
63 ﬁrms.
As for ROE, the same pattern is observed as
with ROA (Figure 13). There is a systematic
improvement each year although the median of
the activist sample does not quite match the
performance of the random sample. Again,
companies that bought back some of their
shares thus decreasing the book value of their
equity will show improved ROE.
Conclusions on operating
performance
One might conclude that, under the prodding
of activist hedge funds, targeted ﬁrms have
improved signiﬁcantly their operating perfor-
mance. But the improvements mapped out in
Figures 9, 11 and 13 largely reﬂect the stalled
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Figure 13: Median results, ROE (surviving firms).
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holders’ equity from share buybacks for a good
number of companies.
Indeed, these operating metrics, although
widely used, are not reliable measures of a ﬁrm’s
true performance as they can be improved by
selling assets, buying back shares, limiting or
reducing investments. But let us illustrate this
point more tangibly by examining the goings-
on at one ﬁrm close to the median of the
‘targeted ﬁrms’.
THE MEDIAN FIRM… FROM THE
2011 SAMPLE – THE DSP GROUP
Starboard Value (2011) announced on 22
August 2011 that it had taken a 9.1 per cent
position in the common equity of DSP Group
(a leading global provider of wireless chipset solutions
for converged communications). The fund’s stated
objective was classiﬁed as ‘omnibus’: in its view,
the board should immediately retract the poison
pill (governance related objective); the com-
pany should reduce spending on non-core
growth (cost reduction); and should hire an
investment bank to explore strategic alterna-
tives, including a sale (sell the company).
Starboard in its letter to management states:
‘The current strategy of investing heavily in
research and development in pursuit of revenue
growth in non-core products has failed to
produce positive results and has led to signiﬁ-
cant deterioration in overall proﬁtability’ (Let-
ter to the CEO and board of directors of DSP
Group from Starboard Value, 22 August 2011).
The management of DSP Group fought hard
against the hedge fund. But, in March 2012, to
placate the hedge fund somewhat, DSP
announces a share buyback programme and
agrees to bring to its board two nominees of
Starboard. As the stock price of DSP does not
move up (in fact by 31 December 2012, it is
down almost 10 per cent from the price on 22
August 2011), Starboard in 2013 launches a
full-ﬂedged proxy ﬁght to have a majority of its
nominees sit on the board.
Despite the support of all three proxy advi-
sory ﬁrms for the management nominees, the
company made a deal with Starboard whereby
it would get four of its nominees on the board.
While ﬁghting the good ﬁght against Starboard,
taking the fund to task for its myopia on R&D
expenses and so forth, management is, willy-
nilly, implementing some of the actions that the
hedge fund is advocating. Our Table 16 shows
clearly the sharp drop in R&D expenses in 2012
before the hedge fund had acquired much
formal leverage over the management of the
company.
The market value of the company has indeed
improved but management claims it is the result
of programs it would have implemented irre-
spective of the hedge fund’s agitation. More
likely, as other funds were showing a strong
inclination to side with Starboard Value in the
2013 proxy ﬁght, thus giving the hedge fund
control over the company, management had
few options but to make a deal and act along
the lines of the wishes of the hedge fund. Be
that as it may, the company is now a much
smaller company in terms of sales, assets,
employees; it spends barely more than half on
R&D as compared with 3 years earlier; whether
it is in the best position to cope with its long-
term challenges remains to be seen but the stock
market, in its inﬁnite wisdom, likes what was
done to the company. [Although by 5 August
2015, the market value of the company had
dropped to $183 million, essentially the value of
the company at t−1 (that is, the year before the
activist intervention).]
At any rate, Starboard provides a good
example of how activist hedge funds make
money by timing well their entry and exit (see
Figure 14). By December 2014, Starboard had
sold most of its shares of DSP; it had done very
well indeed for its fund and still has four of its
nominees on the board of DSP (out of nine
members).
This case, a fairly typical one, shows the
complexity of assessing the impact of hedge fund
activism in the long term. Each situation is
somewhat different; the interaction, the chess
match, between the company’s management
and the hedge fund is made of moves and
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counter-moves. The hedge fund’s goal is to make
money as quickly as possible and it will stick
around just long enough to achieve a good rate
of return. What happens to the company after
their departure is of little concern to them.
Typically, after the departure of the hedge fund,
the management and the board of the company
will assess the situation and resume managing the











Sales (t−2= 100) 106.27 91.36 76.36 71.19 67.41
R&D (t−2= 100) 99.00 94.83 75.76 62.34 59.61
Assets (t−2= 100) 101.27 89.21 84.26 87.49 86.99
Employees (t−2= 100) 101.22 96.58 77.51 72.62 N/A
Shares (t−2= 100) 101.54 98.26 94.64 97.59 94.06
ROSa −0.0325 −0.0836 −0.0492 0.0179 0.0252
ATb 1.3540 1.2280 1.1194 1.0431 0.9729
ROA (ROS*AT) −0.0440 −0.1026 −0.0551 0.0187 0.0245
Tobin’s Q 1.1327 0.7888 0.8778 1.4722 1.5969
ROEc −0.0446 −0.1029 −0.0553 0.0185 0.0245
Market Cap at year end
($ millions)d
189.28 117.24 124.84 217.02 234.14
Cash and STEe per share 2.7496 2.1715 1.9381 1.6801 1.5169
CASPRf N/A −0.3599 −0.1588 0.0605 0.0750
Economic proﬁt (ROA*Assets)
($ millions)
−9.80 −20.12 −10.20 3.59 4.68
aROS=Net Operating Proﬁt After Tax (NOPAT)/Sales.
bAT=Revenues/(average shareholders’ equity+average interest-bearing debt).
cROE=Net Income/average shareholders’ equity.
dOn 22 August 2011, the announcement date, the market cap was 152.95.
eCash and STE=Cash and short-term equivalents.















12/31/2010 12/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 12/31/2014
DSP Group Stock Price (left scale)
000s shares on Starboard 13F (right scale)
Figure 14: DSP group historical share price and shares held by starboard according to its 13F
filings from 31 December 2010 to 31 March 2015.
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company for the longer term. That is, if the
threat of another attack is not likely or imminent.
STOCK MARKET
PERFORMANCE
Obviously, the main selling point for hedge
fund activism is the claim that it generates high
returns. But that statement is ambiguous. As we
illustrated with the case of the DSP Group,
activist hedge funds, by timing their entry and
exit of a stock, by using derivatives and leverage
to enhance their yield, by beneﬁting from the
‘control’ premium on getting companies sold
off, may well achieve highly positive results.
For instance, Table 17 shows the large gains
realized by hedge funds from getting targeted
companies sold off.
Greenwood and Schor (2009) had already
concluded that the returns of activist hedge
funds were largely explained by the ability of
activists to force target ﬁrms into a takeover.
That hedge funds may achieve high returns
from their activities is not the issue, although
that is the feature that brings so many pension
funds and other institutional investors to chan-
nel money to these activists. Overall, what
should concern society and all shareholders
should be the operating and stock market
performance of targeted companies.
Let us suppose one would, on 31 December
of the year before activist hedge funds showed
up (31 December 2009 for the 2010 cohort and
31 December 2010 for the 2011 cohort), have
bought shares in all targeted companies and at
the same time had purchased shares in all the
companies in our random sample. What would
be the comparative performance of these two
(unweighted) ‘portfolios’ over the 3 years? That
is a salient question.
We computed the share price returns by
using three different methods: (i) the com-
pounded annual returns for all ﬁrms still in the
sample on 31 December in each of the 3 years
following the intervention year [labelled listed
ﬁrms at year end]; (ii) the compounded annual
returns on 31 December of the 3 years follow-
ing intervention year, but only for the surviving
ﬁrms at t+3, thus comparing the returns of the
same companies over time [labelled surviving
ﬁrms]; and (iii) the compounded annual returns
for all ﬁrms still in the sample on 31 December
of the 3 years following intervention year, but
factoring in the annualized returns of the ﬁrms
Table 17: Compounded annual return to activist






Mean (n= 74)a 59.00
a81 ﬁrms were sold or merged. The terms of the
transactions made it impossible to compile the data for
seven of these cases (for example, exchange of shares,
price paid in both shares and dollars and so on).
Table 18: Median results, compounded annual stock price returns and comparison of several methods
From 31 December t−1 to Listed ﬁrms at year end Surviving ﬁrms All ﬁrms, even sold off
Activist sample Random sample Activist sample Random sample Activist sample Random sample
31 December, t: Event year −0.0094 0.0075 −0.0180 0.0135 −0.0004 0.0075
n 241 255 161 219 246 255
31 December, t+1 0.0091 0.0205 0.0111 0.0257 0.0332 0.0247
n 208 250 161 219 238 253
31 December, t+2 0.1007 0.0728 0.0901 0.0730 0.1007 0.0749
n 189 229 160 219 205 241
31 December, t+3 0.0906 0.0704 0.0909 0.0722 0.1056 0.0726
n 176 220 159 218 188 227
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sold during a given year3 [labelled all ﬁrms, even
sold off ].
Table 18 presents the median results of these
computations and in Table 19 the mean results.
Overall, median results for targeted and random
companies show that they were performing gen-
erally poorly and both improved signiﬁcantly
over the next years.
The mean performance of targeted compa-
nies after 2 years or 3 years is not signiﬁcantly
different from the stock performance of a random
sample of companies. Neither ‘portfolio’, because
of their industry make-up, could match the
performance of broad indices (Table 20).
The large difference in favour of the random
sample at t= event year reﬂects the sensitivity of
averages to a few extreme cases.4
Figure 15 shows that stock price performance
also varies widely by quintile, with the second and
third quintile showing the largest appreciation.
To further capture the dynamics of stock price
appreciation for our two samples, we computed
the relationship between the stock price of each
ﬁrm at t−1 (the year before the arrival of the
hedge fund) and the stock price at t+3.
Table 21 shows that about a quarter of both
samples had stock prices at t+3 that were inferior
to their stock price at t−1, a very signiﬁcant result.
About a third of both samples of companies
had seen a doubling (or more) of their stock
Table 19: Mean results, compounded annual stock price returns and comparison of several methods
From 31 December, t−1 to Listed ﬁrms at year end Surviving ﬁrms All ﬁrms, even sold off
Activist sample Random sample Activist sample Random sample Activist sample Random sample
31 December, t:Event year 0.0118a 0.1513 0.0023a 0.1787 0.0301b 0.1513
n 241 255 161 219 246 255
31 December, t+1 −0.0022 0.0408 0.0053b 0.0488 0.0328 0.0436
n 208 250 161 219 238 253
31 December, t+2 0.0684 0.0721 0.0666 0.0826 0.0740 0.0787
n 189 229 160 219 205 241
31 December, t+3 0.0816 0.0709 0.0857 0.0775 0.0909 0.0713
n 176 220 159 218 188 227
aDifference between the means (activist–random, same year, same method) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per
cent level.
bDifference between the means (activist–random, same year, same method) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5
per cent level.
Table 20: Compounded annual index returns for
the perioda t+1 to t+3
t+1 t+2 t+3
S&P 500 0.064 0.114 0.133
Dow Jones Industrial 0.072 0.106 0.118
NASDAQ 0.069 0.135 0.160
RUSSELL 2000 0.062 0.126 0.138
Activist sampleb 0.033 0.074 0.091
Random sampleb 0.044 0.079 0.071
aAverage return, weighted by the number of ﬁrms in
the samples per year.
bMean returns with the third method: All ﬁrms,
even the ones that were sold off.
Table 21: Distribution of ﬁrms by increase in













a(Market value at t+3/Market value at t−1) × 100.
Allaire and Dauphin
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1741-3591 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance Vol. 13, 4, 279–308298
price in the same period. It is striking how the
performance of the random sample matches the




Table 5 has shown the very different objectives
put forth by activist hedge funds as they make
public their intentions.
Companies targeted for a sale
For instance, it shows that in some 80 cases, the
activist hedge funds were urging a sale of the
company or some asset restructuring. Table 22
shows the median characteristics of these 80
targeted companies. These were substantially
larger companies than for the whole sample. It
also shows that 33 of these companies were sold
off (or 40 per cent), 6 were the object of spin-off
or asset restructuring. In 10 cases, the activist funds
were still on board by the end of the study period.
However, actually 81 companies in our tar-
geted sample were effectively sold off. Table 23
shows what were the objectives stated by activist
hedge funds when they launched their cam-
paign. Of course, as we already saw, some
33 had been clearly targeted for a sale, but for
48 other cases different objectives stated by the









t t+1 t+2 t+3
1st Quintile (n=30) 2nd Quintile (n=29)
3rd Quintile (n=29) 4th Quintile (n=34)
5th Quintile (n=42) All targeted firms (n=164)
Figure 15: Compounded annual stock price returns (t−1 to t+n*) and median results for the
targeted firms, per quintile (surviving firms).
*Where n varies from 0 to 3.
Table 22: Median results of a set of descriptive variables at t−1 for the ﬁrms targeted with the objective ‘Sell
the company or asset restructuration’ (n= 80)
Market cap at campaign date(M$) 308.4
Total assets ($ millions) 810.5
Revenues ($ millions) 494.4




1-year share price returna −0.0105
Number of ﬁrms sold 33
Number of ﬁrms who completed a spin-off or sold signiﬁcant assets (divisions) 6
Number of activists who still had a stake in the targeted ﬁrm at t+3 10
aFrom 31 December, year t−1 to 31 December, year t.
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We have already examined the returns and
impact on stock market performance of the
companies that were sold off (see Tables 17,
18 and 19).
The 75 companies where the activist
hedge fund sought changes to
governance structure or to the
board
Hedge funds listing change to governance as their
purpose ended up being unsuccessful a third of
the times and managed to get board representa-
tion a quarter of the times (Table 24). They got
the company or substantial assets sold in 18 per
cent of the cases (although this was not stated as
their objective). Finally, they did get some
changes in governance or the CEO replaced in a
ﬁfth of the cases.
However, as documented in Table 25,
despite the ‘initiatives’ fostered on them by
hedge funds the stock market performance of
these targeted companies was mediocre at
best.
The 45 companies where the activist
sought to have them increase
payout by buying back their shares
or paying a special dividend.
Table 26 shows the statistics for the subset of 45
targeted ﬁrms, where the objective of the hedge
fund was to increase payout. These are quite
small companies (median market cap of $78
million and median revenues of $49 million)
showing fair operating results but with a poor
Tobin’s Q (0.90) and considerable cash on their
balance sheet (some $3.42 per share).
Table 23: Stated objectives for targeted ﬁrms that were eventually sold of merged
n Percentage of ﬁrms targeted with objective Percentage of ﬁrms sold
Sell the company or asset restructuration 33 41.25 40.74
Governance structure or board change 17 22.97 20.99
Change in payout policy 12 26.67 14.81
Cost reduction 6 40.00 7.41
Omnibus 4 25.00 4.94
Other 5 31.25 6.17
Undisclosed or vaguely described 4 30.77 4.94
Total number of companies sold 81 — 100.00
Table 24: Final outcome of campaigns where activist hedge fund sought changes to governance structure or
to the board
Final outcome n Percentage of ﬁrms in sub-group
Change to governance structure 10 13.51
Company was solda 9 12.16
Change of CEO 5 6.76
Assets were sold 4 5.41
Change to payout policy 1 1.35
Company ﬁled for bankruptcy 1 1.35
Board representation (as the only public outcome) 19 25.68
Activist was unsuccessful 25 33.78
Total 74 100.00
aAnother eight companies were also sold but not as a result of the campaigns of 2010 or 2011; these were
classiﬁed as ‘unsuccessful’.
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Hence, the appeal for hedge funds to come
on board and push for increasing payout to
shareholders to boost share price. Did it work?
Table 27 shows a strong, sustained com-
pounded annual share price return for the 3
years but it must be pointed out that the stock
market performance of these companies for the
year of the hedge fund’s arrival was already
quite strong (median 11.2 per cent; mean 19.7
per cent). Indeed the mean share price return
drops from time= t to time= t+3.
It is unknown how their stock price would
have behaved without a share buyback
programme.
The performance of the five most
active funds
The ﬁve most active hedge funds carried out
some 67 campaigns against targeted ﬁrms.
Compared with the overall sample, these
activists tended to target larger ﬁrms and hold
their position for a longer period of time
(Table 28).
The stock market performance of the com-
panies they targeted appears to have been better
than that of other activists, signiﬁcantly so in
several cases, as reported in Table 29.
Other interesting statistics about the Top 5
funds: 31.8 per cent of ﬁrms were targeted
with a stated objective of a change in the
payout policy, 25.8 per cent were targeted
with the objective to sell the company or spin
off a division and the Top 5 resorts to the
threat of a proxy ﬁght or actually launches a
proxy ﬁght as main tactics to pursue their
objectives (45.5 per cent of cases were targeted
using both tactics).
Table 25: Median and mean share price annualized
returns (Sub-group of ﬁrms where activist hedge
fund sought changes to governance structure or to
the board (listed ﬁrms method))
t t+1 t+2 t+3
Median −0.0699 −0.0579 0.0332 0.0512
Mean −0.0385 −0.0371 0.0279 0.0381
n 71 68 61 58
Table 26: Median results of a set of descriptive variables at t−1 for all targeted ﬁrms and the subset of 45 ﬁrms
targeted with an objective of increasing payout
Activist sample (total N= 259) Activist sample, only ﬁrms targeted with an
objective of Δ payout policy (N= 45)
Market cap ($ millions) 171.03 78.31
Total assets ($ millions) 374.15 326.87




Tobin’s Q 1.1569 0.8986
Cash and Short-term equivalents per share 2.2760 3.4250
1-year share price returna −0.0094 0.1120
aFrom 31 December, year t−1, to 31 December, year t.
Table 27: Share price return for a subsample of

















Median 0.1120 0.1292 0.1507 0.1416
Mean 0.1967 0.1141 0.1265 0.1238
n 45 45 42 41
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The performance of the largest
targeted firms (Top 20 per cent in
market cap value)
These largest companies present a different
pattern of statistics with median market cap of
$5.1 billion and $3.6 billion, respectively, for
the activist sample and the random sample
(Table 30). At the median, they exhibit rather
positive operating and stock market perfor-
mance the year before being targeted.
The objectives of hedge fund when targeting
these larger companies are also different with a
large majority advocating either the sale of the
company (or spin-off of assets) or a change to its
governance or board of directors (Table 31).
Indeed, nine ﬁrms in this group were eventually
sold off.
However, the share price performance for
this sub-group of large companies, shown in
Table 32, indicate a strong performance but not
one that is statistically better than the perfor-
mance of a random sample of companies.
Target firms where activist hedge
fund obtained at least one board
seat
Even if not formally requested by hedge funds
at the time of the public announcement of their
equity participation, in 79 cases, the hedge
funds got to nominate at least one member of
the board of a targeted company.
Table 33 presents the operating perfor-
mance and stock market performance of these
Table 28: Five most active hedge funds: Descriptive statistics
Variables Median Mean
Stake ownership at announcement 8.3% 8.7%
Holding Period (days)a 511.5 609.7
Market cap of target ﬁrms at announcement ($ millions) 206.4 2563.8
Tobin’s Q of targeted ﬁrms at t−1 1.16 1.45
ROA of target ﬁrms at t−1 0.0379 0.0203
aIn 27.3 per cent of the cases, the activist hedge funds still had a stake in the targeted ﬁrm as of April 2015.
Table 29: Top ﬁve activists’ compounded annual stock price return (listed ﬁrms method) (compared with
other activists and random sample)
From 31 December, year t−1 to 31 December, t: Event year 31 December, t+1 31 December, t+2 31 December, t+3
Top 5 activists
Mean 0.0937 0.0433 0.1377 0.1295
Median 0.0174 0.0572 0.1379 0.1328
n 61 56 52 49
All other activists
Mean 0.0051 −0.0125 0.0446 0.0589
Median −0.0400 −0.0217 0.0858 0.0699
n 184 156 141 131
t-test, difference between means
t-stat (Top 5 – Other) 1.1760 1.1396 2.6040a 2.0817b
Signiﬁcance 0.1212 0.1285 0.0052 0.0198
aDifference between the means is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level.
bDifference between the means is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level.
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companies. The results indicate a compounded
annual return of 5–6 per cent after 2 years, a
mean ROA that remains negative, a Tobin’s Q
that shows some improvement. In all cases,
these results are not better, and in a few cases,
worse than those of a random sample.
CONCLUSIONS ON STOCK
MARKET PERFORMANCE
Overall, the stock price performance of compa-
nies targeted by hedge funds tends to show
some improvement over a couple of years after
the arrival of these funds. The standard set of
actions they urge on companies are well
Table 30: Median results of a set of descriptive
variables at t−1 for the targeted ﬁrms and the
random sample in the 5th quintile of market cap at t:
Event year (larger ﬁrms)
Activist sample Random sample
Market Cap ($ millions) 5119.6 3642.0
Total Assets ($ millions) 5570.8 4558.5




Tobin’s Q 1.6190 1.8500
1-year share price returna 0.1593 0.0596
aFrom 31 December, year t−1, to 31 December,
year t.
Table 32: Targeted ﬁrms in the 5th quintile of market cap at t: Event year (larger ﬁrms) (Compounded
annual stock price return (CASPR) (listed ﬁrms method))
From 31 December, year t−1 to 31 December, t: Event year 31 December, t+1 31 December, t+2 31 December, t+3
Target ﬁrms in 5th quintile of market cap
Mean 0.0871 0.0241 0.1033 0.1238
Median 0.1593 0.0757 0.1028 0.1358
n 49 43 42 41
Random ﬁrms in 5th quintile of market cap
Mean 0.1276 0.0474 0.0809 0.0940
Median 0.0596 0.0583 0.0746 0.0852
n 50 50 48 48
t-tests, difference between means
t-stat (Activist – Random) −0.6198 −0.5379 0.6833 0.8965
Signiﬁcance 0.2684 0.2962 0.2485 0.1867
Table 31: Activist hedge funds’ stated objectives for the targeted ﬁrms in the 5th quintile of market cap at t:
Event year (larger ﬁrms)
Stated objectives n Percentage of ﬁrms in quintile
Sell the company or asset restructuration (including spin-off) 23 44.23
Governance structure or board change 10 19.23
Change in payout policy 4 7.69
Cost reduction 1 1.92
Omnibus 4 7.69
Other 4 7.69
Undisclosed or vaguely described 6 11.54
Total 52 100.00
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received by the stock market. But, as shown in
Table 20, the increase (or decrease) in market
value of targeted ﬁrms maps closely what
happened to a random sample of ﬁrms over the
same period.
Furthermore, the stock market performance
of targeted companies varies widely according
to the objective pursued or the nature of the
funds. Getting companies merged or sold off is a
clear driver of hedge fund performance. The
targeted companies where hedge funds were
calling for increased payout (usually through
shares buyback) show strong stock market
performance overall, although these targeted
companies were already doing well in the year
the hedge funds came on board.
Also, the most active hedge funds seem to do
a better job of extracting returns from targeted
companies.
Larger targeted companies show good stock
market performance but not really better than
that of a random sample of large companies.
Getting at least one of their nominees on the
board of a targeted company does not seem to
translate into a better stock market performance
for the company.
Given that the average holding period of
these activists is some 1.5 years, it is question-
able to attribute to hedge funds any improve-
ment in performances 3 years after their
intervention.
It appears that companies are fairly resilient
and those that are not sold off seem to show
evidence that management tries to pick up




We had formulated a number of research
objectives for this study:
 Describe the contemporary tactics and objec-
tives of activist hedge funds as well as the
actions taken by targeted companies as a
result of their intervention
Table 33: Target ﬁrms where activist hedge fund obtained at least one board seat (Operating and stock
market performance (listed ﬁrms method))
t: Event year t+1 t+2 t+3
CASPR, from 31 December, year t−1 to 31 December, year t+n (listed ﬁrms method)
Mean −0.0022a −0.0353b 0.0553 0.0689
Median −0.0468 −0.0144 0.0666 0.0655
ROA
Mean −0.0375 −0.0322b −0.0402 −0.0870
Median 0.0062 0.0186 0.0187 0.0266
Tobin’s Q
Mean 1.5035b 1.4855 2.1055 2.2170
Median 1.2189 1.1544 1.4722 1.8871
n 79 69 63 52
aDifference between the means (activist sample with board seat – random) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per
cent level.
bDifference between the means (activist sample with board seat – random) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per
cent level.
Note: In all instances where the differences are statistically signiﬁcant, the mean of the activist sample is inferior
to the mean of the random sample.
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 Explore the consequences of activism over
time when compared with a random sample
of ﬁrms with similar characteristics at the
time of intervention (effects on operational
performance and share price returns)
 Analyse the singularities associated with sali-
ent sub-groups of targeted ﬁrms
We believe these objectives were achieved.
What conclusions may be drawn from this
study?
First, the small size of the companies targeted
by activist hedge funds is striking. Of course,
there are a number of large ones that get the
lion share of media attention but the fact that
15 per cent of the companies targeted in 2010
and 2011 by ‘activists’ were traded over the
counter (so called ‘pink sheets’) rings a number
of alarm bells. From a research standpoint, it
calls for great care in reaching conclusions as to
improvement in operating and stock market
performance. It certainly invites to caution in
assessing the reported performance of hedge
funds that make it their business to target these
very small companies.
Our study, similar to several others, show
that the best way, bar none, for these activists to
make money for their funds is to get the
company sold off or substantial assets spun off.
We have shown pretty clear and compelling
evidence that the much vaunted ‘improve-
ments’ in operating performance (ROA,
ROE, Tobin’s Q) result in good part from
some basic ﬁnancial manoeuvres (cutting
R&D, selling assets, cutting capital expendi-
tures, buying back shares and so on).
Because of the stock market’s focus with
these sorts of ratios (and earnings per share),
the market value of the targeted companies
tend to increase moderately. However, in sev-
eral cases, the stock market performance of
targeted companies is no better than that of a
matched random sample.
However, there is no overwhelming evi-
dence of deterioration either. That is not a
result that owes to the forbearance of activists.
What happens to the company after their
departure is of little concern to hedge funds.
For a time, boards and management manage
their company to please the activist investor:
new or increased share repurchase programs,
workforce reduction, cuts in R&D and SG&A
expenses, sell all assets generating only ‘low’
proﬁtability, stop all expansion plans and so on.
All these measures have a catalyst effect on the
ﬁnancial ratios followed by the markets. If the
CEO or CFO is opposed to this course of
action, chances are this person will be looking
for a new job quite rapidly after the activist’s
arrival.
Typically, after the departure of the hedge
fund, the management and the board of the
company will assess the situation and resume
managing the company for the longer term.
That is, if the threat of another attack is not
likely or imminent.
To really understand what is happening
when a hedge fund targets a company and after
the fund departs (assuming the company has not
been sold in the process), one should delve into
the speciﬁcs of each situation: the interaction,
the chess match, between the company’s man-
agement and the hedge fund is dynamic, made
of moves and counter-moves as illustrated
above by the short description of the DSP
Group’s experience.
The varying objectives and tactics of hedge
funds and the distinctive proﬁles of targeted
ﬁrms result in several different clusters of acti-
vism, which, when merged, make it nary
impossible to understand the consequences and
performance of this form of activism. Studies
mixing a large number of instances of activism
across a long period of time are bound to
produce misleading results.
Whatever their ultimate goal, hedge funds
may begin by seeking board representation and
will not hesitate to launch a proxy ﬁght to
achieve their immediate goal; in the process,
they will disparage current management and
board members; once represented on the board,
they will pursue their real objective and call for
change of the CEO or the CFO (or both) if not
compliant enough.
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In general, the stock’s performance of tar-
geted companies over a 3-year span barely
matches the performance of a random sample
of companies. But the activist hedge funds, by
timing their entry and exit of a stock, by using
derivatives and leverage on occasion to enhance
their yield, by beneﬁting from the ‘control’
premium on getting companies sold off, may
well achieve highly positive results.
The real beneﬁciaries of the actions of these
hedge funds are the fund managers themselves and
their investors, largely institutional investors and
pension funds, which of course supply tons of
money to these activists.
For targeted companies, the most immediate
consequence is the likelihood of being sold off.
We shall never know whether these sold-off companies
could have developed into industrial champions on
their own. For other targeted companies, this
hedge fund episode often results in change of
senior management and board members, cuts in
people, stagnating capital expenditures and
R&D; while not lethal over the short period of
time that these hedge funds hang around,
companies come out of the experience as shrunken
ﬁrms that may have lost a couple of years to their
competitors.
Discussion
The most fundamental issue raised by the
phenomenon of hedge fund activism is the
crucial assumption that underpins their activities
(or at the very least underpins the advocates’
arguments in their favour), that is:
Outsiders analysing ﬁnancial data from afar can
determine that a company is not managed so as to
maximize value for its shareholders and that some
speciﬁc actions they have identiﬁed should be taken
that would beneﬁt shareholders and would be in the
long-term interest of the company.
Indeed, the argument is made that the cuts in
R&D and capital expenditures are applied only
to those projects that have no economic justiﬁ-
cation, that the allocation of cash resources to
buy back shares is a better use than some
misguided capital investment; of course selling
the company (or splitting it up) provides the best
outcome for the company and contributes to the
overall efﬁciency of the economic system.
An essential corollary of this ‘argument’ has
to be that, in many instances which activists are
particularly adept at spotting, management and
boards of directors are incompetent, compla-
cent, lack foresight and are unable to act in a
manner that serves the best interest of their
company. Given the very small size of most
companies targeted by hedge funds, that may
occur more readily.
But to accept that occurrence as a general
rule would be misguided.
Yet, some researchers claim that ‘Activist
investors don’t slash budgets indiscriminately.
They treat R&D as a form of investment …
they examined whether outlays for R&D were
directed toward the ﬁrm’s core competency. If
not, those funds were likely to be cut’ (Jiang,
2015).
It would seem a bit unusual that managers,
despite their large stock-related compensation,
would, with the blessing of their board of
directors, waste or misspend R&D funds; until,
that is, a wise, better-informed activist hedge
fund manager comes around to point out the
errors of their way.
Either that concept of the business world is
accurate, then the whole system of governance
of publicly listed businesses must be scrapped
and shareholders should call the shot directly
and give their marching orders to management;
or that view is wrong and management and
boards of directors know best what is in the
long-term interest of the company. That is a
clear choice and one that underpins much of
the divergent views on the role and impact of
activist hedge funds.
While activist hedge funds (and a number of
academics, sheltered by reams of data) have a
stake in the ﬁrst point of view, business people
and those whose jobs bring them in close
contact with the real world of business tend to
partake of the second point of view.
This research does not provide any evidence
of the superior strategic sagacity of hedge fund
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managers but does point to their keen under-
standing of what moves stock prices in the short
term. Indeed, in none of the 259 cases studied
here did hedge funds make proposals of a
strategic nature to enhance the long-term per-
formance of the ﬁrm.
That should concern society, governments,
pension funds, mutual funds and other institu-
tional investors with pretension of a long-term
investment horizon.
NOTES
1 It has become standard procedure to
calculate ‘propensity scores’ to establish the
best match between a non-randomized
sample and a randomized control sample
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In this
case, it would call for the constitution of a
random sample which, in terms of its
characteristics, corresponds as closely as
possible to the characteristics of ﬁrms that
were targeted by hedge funds. However, as
we saw, the objectives sought by hedge
funds are varied, often subjective, and do
not correlate in many cases to speciﬁc
ﬁnancial data (Table 14). The heterogeneity
of factors in activism and the methodological
challenges it induces has been well
documented (Goranova and Verstegen
Ryan, 2014). We do believe that the match
observed in Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13 is as
close a match as could be obtained.
2 Q1–Q4 were bounded intervals for the
random selection process, while Q5 was
only left-bounded. This resulted in ﬁrms of
slightly smaller size at the median level for
Q5 in the random sample, mostly because of
a larger dispersion. We do not believe that
such a difference, for ﬁrms of larger size, has
any incidence on the interpretation of the
results in this study. The average market
capitalization at campaign date for the
random sample was $6.8 billion, almost two
times the median shown in Table 13.
3 But without re-investment of the proceeds
of the sale; or assuming that the proceeds is
re-invested in the portfolio of remaining
targeted ﬁrms, which will lead to the same
results.
4 Even after a standard winsorization process
at the 1 and 99 per cent level.
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